Chamberlain v Giampapa by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-28-2000 
Chamberlain v Giampapa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Chamberlain v Giampapa" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 68. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/68 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed March 28, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 









VINCENT C. GIAMPAPA, M.D., individually and dba 
PLASTIC SURGERY CENTER INTERNATIONALE 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 98-cv-01048) 
District Judge: Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry 
 
Argued: November 16, 1999 
 
BEFORE: ALITO and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and 
FEIKENS,* District Judge 
 





*Honorable John Feikens, Senior United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation. 
 
 
       Howard B. Felcher (Argued) 
       20 Northfield Avenue 
       West Orange, NJ 07052 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
       Stephen O. Mortenson (Argued) 
       Mortenson & Pomeroy 
       155 Morris Avenue 
       Springfield, NJ 07081 
        Attorney for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Robin Chamberlain appeals from the dismissal of her 
medical malpractice complaint filed in the United States 
District Court of New Jersey. Count I of the complaint 
alleged negligent medical treatment and care by the 
defendant physician, and Count II alleged a failure to 
properly advise and inform the plaintiff of the nature and 
extent of a surgical procedure the defendant performed on 
her. Jurisdiction was based on the diversity of the 
citizenship of the parties. The District Court dismissed both 
counts of Chamberlain's complaint with prejudice  for failure 
to file a timely affidavit of merit pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. 
SS 2A:53A-26 to -29 (West 1987) ("the New Jersey affidavit 
of merit statute").1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 2A:53A-27 provides: 
 
       In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or 
       property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or 
       negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, 
the 
 
       plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the 
       answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant 
       with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there 
exists 
       a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge 
exercised 
 
       or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject 
of 
       the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational 
       standards or treatment practices. The court may grant no more than 
       one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, tofile the affidavit 
       pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. 
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Chamberlain also appeals the denial of her cross-motion 
for (1) a sixty-day extension in which to file the affidavit of 
merit; or (2) an order allowing the affidavit of merit to be 
filed nunc pro tunc; or (3) permission to amend the 
complaint and attach the affidavit of merit; and/or (4) an 
order striking defendant's answer as untimely and granting 
plaintiff a default judgment. 
 
We address five distinct issues in the disposition of this 
appeal: 
 
       1) Whether the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute 
       can properly be applied by a federal court sitting in 
       diversity; 
 
       2) Whether the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute 
       applies to a claim based on the absence of informed 
       consent; 
 
       3) If the New Jersey statute does apply in diversity 
       actions, whether Chamberlain's complaint was properly 
       dismissed with prejudice for failure tofile an affidavit of 
       merit; 
 
       4) Whether the District Court erred in dismissing the 
       entire complaint, when one or more of the alleged acts 
       of negligence may have occurred before the effective 
       date of the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute; 
 
       5) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
       denying Chamberlain's motion for default judgment. 
 
We hold that the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute 
does not conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and must be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity; 
the District Court did not plainly err in applying the 
affidavit of merit statute to the lack of informed consent 
cause of action; there are no extraordinary circumstances 
that would warrant dismissal without prejudice; and the 
denial of a default judgment was not an abuse of discretion. 
However, we further conclude that the District Court erred 
in dismissing the plaintiff's case when the record indicates 
that one or more of the alleged negligent acts occurred 
before the effective date of the affidavit of merit statute. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District 
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The New Jersey affidavit of merit statute applies to 
medical malpractice causes of action that "occur" on or 
after June 29, 1995, the effective date of the statute.2 It 
requires that the plaintiff file an affidavit of a licensed 
physician within 60 days of the date the answer isfiled or 
face dismissal of the complaint. In the affidavit, the 
physician must state that a "reasonable probability" exists 
that the care that is the subject of the complaint falls 
outside acceptable professional standards. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2A:53A-27. In lieu of an affidavit, the plaintiff may provide 
a sworn statement that, after written request, the defendant 
failed to provide the plaintiff with records that have a 
substantial bearing on preparation of the affidavit.3 N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 2A:53A-28. Failure to provide either the 
affidavit or the sworn statement within 60 days, or 120 
days if the court grants an extension for good cause, results 
in dismissal for "failure to state a cause of action."4 N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 2A:53A-29. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "This act shall take effect immediately[June 29, 1995] and shall apply 
to causes of action which occur on or after the effective date of this 
act." 





3. "An affidavit shall not be required pursuant to [N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2A:53A-27] if the plaintiff provides a sworn statement in lieu of the 
affidavit setting forth that: the defendant has failed to provide 
plaintiff 
 
with medical records or other records or information having a 
substantial bearing on preparation of the affidavit; a written request 
therefor along with, if necessary, a signed authorization by the plaintiff 
for release of the medical records or other records or information 
requested, has been made by certified mail or personal service; and at 
least 45 days have elapsed since the defendant received the request." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:53A-28. 
 
4. "If the plaintiff fails to provide an affidavit or a statement in lieu 
thereof, pursuant to [N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:53A-27 or S 2A:53A-28], it 
shall 
 
be deemed a failure to state a cause of action." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:53A- 
29. 
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In January of 1994, Dr. Vincent C. Giampapa performed 
plastic surgery on the plaintiff's nose. Thereafter, he 
injected cortisone in her nose on several occasions. On 
August 20, 1995, the plaintiff visited Dr. Giampapa for a 
checkup and, at his suggestion, she allowed him to perform 
a second plastic surgery, which she expected to be minor. 
The plaintiff claims Dr. Giampapa instead performed 
extensive surgery without properly advising her about, and 
obtaining consent for, the procedure. The plaintiff 
experienced problems after the August 20 surgery, and, as 
a result, Dr. Giampapa performed additional plastic surgery 
on March 20, 1996. When the plaintiff continued to 
experience problems, she sought medical care and 
treatment from another plastic surgeon and underwent 
extensive reconstructive surgery. 
 
The plaintiff sued Dr. Giampapa on March 10, 1998, 
alleging negligence with respect to her medical care and 
treatment. The defendant's answer, filed on May 8th, 
responded to the complaint in full but did not include a 
demand for an affidavit of merit from the plaintiff. 
 
The Magistrate Judge issued a Pre-Trial Scheduling 
Order on June 10th and the defendant provided the 
plaintiff with her medical records on June 17th, three 
weeks before the deadline for filing an affidavit of merit. The 
plaintiff did not file an affidavit of merit within 60 days of 
the answer being filed and did not request an extension 
before the 60-day statutory period expired. The plaintiff 
made no attempt to file the affidavit or request an extension 
until the defendant filed his motion to dismiss in November 
1998. 
 
The scheduling order did not mention the affidavit 
requirement and, according to the parties, no discussion of 
the affidavit of merit took place at the June 10 scheduling 
conference. Nevertheless, as part of the scheduling order, 
the plaintiff was directed to serve an expert report on the 
defendant no later than September 30, 1998, which she 
did. In the report, the expert stated his opinion that the 
treatment by the defendant deviated significantly from the 
accepted standards of medical care and that the plaintiff 
suffered permanent nasal deformity and associated 
breathing difficulties as a result. 
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The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss based 
on the plaintiff's failure to file an affidavit of merit. On the 
same day, the plaintiff filed her cross-motion. The District 
Court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion in its entirety and 
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. Both counts of 
the complaint were dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiff 
appeals both the dismissal of her complaint and the denial 




A. The Choice Of Law Issue 
 
A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law. See Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This 
substantive/procedural dichotomy of the "Erie  rule" must 
be applied with the objective that "in all cases where a 
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the 
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the 
litigation in the federal court [will] be substantially the 
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a 
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court." Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). This focus on 
whether application of a state rule will or may affect the 
outcome is intended to serve "twin aims":"discouragement 
of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws." Hanna v. Plummer , 380 U.S. 
460, 468 (1965). Accordingly, the outcome determinative 
test should not produce a decision favoring application of 
the state rule unless one of these aims will be furthered: 
 
       Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal 
       court sitting in a diversity case is faced with a question 
       of whether or not to apply state law, the importance of 
       a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context 
       of asking whether application of the rule would make 
       so important a difference to the character or result of 
       the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly 
       discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or 
       whether application of the rule would have so 
       important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of 
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       the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to 
       cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court. 
 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n. 9. 
 
The Supreme Court has added two caveats to these Erie 
principles. First, even though application of the state rule 
may hold some potential for affecting the outcome, a strong 
countervailing federal interest will dictate recourse to the 
federal rule. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Coop, Inc., 
356 U.S. 525 (1958). Second, the Erie rule may not be 
"invoked to void a Federal Rule" of Civil Procedure. Hanna 
v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). Where a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure provides a resolution of an issue, 
that rule must be applied by a federal court sitting in 
diversity to the exclusion of a conflicting state rule so long 
as the federal rule is authorized by the Rules Enabling Act 
and consistent with the Constitution. Id. 
 
Under Hanna, a federal court sitting in diversity first 
must determine whether a Federal Rule directly "collides" 
with the state law it is being urged to apply. See id. at 470- 
74. If there is such a direct conflict, the Federal Rule must 
be applied if it is constitutional and within the scope of the 
Rules Enabling Act. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n. 7 (1996). If a "direct collision" 
does not exist, then the court applies the Erie rule to 
determine if state law should be applied. Hanna , 380 U.S. 
at 470. 
 
In deciding whether a Federal Rule "directly collides" with 
a state law, the federal court sitting in diversity must 
consider whether the scope of the Federal Rule is 
"sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court," 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980), 
"thereby leaving no room for the operation of[the state] 
law," Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4- 
5 (1987). Although the Rules should be given their plain 
meaning and are not to be construed narrowly in order to 
avoid a direct collision, see Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n. 9, 
"a broad reading that would create significant disuniformity 
between state and federal courts should be avoided if the 
text permits." Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 37- 
38 (1988). "Federal courts have interpreted the Federal 
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Rules, however, with sensitivity to important state interests 
and regulatory policies." Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7. 
 
In the case at hand, the plaintiff argues the New Jersey 
affidavit of merit statute conflicts with Federal Rules 8 and 
9, which govern the content of pleadings in federal actions. 
Rule 8 requires only "a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a). The only situations that require pleading with 
particularity are specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9, and a 
malpractice claim is not one of the situations listed in that 
rule. There is, of course, no contention that Federal Rules 
8 and 9 are beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act or 
inconsistent with the Constitution. 
 
We find no direct conflict between the New Jersey 
affidavit of merit statute and Federal Rules 8 and 9. Rules 
8 and 9 dictate the content of the pleadings and the degree 
of specificity that is required. The rules' overall purpose is 
to provide notice of the claims and defenses of the parties. 
The affidavit of merit statute has no effect on what is 
included in the pleadings of a case or the specificity thereof. 
The required affidavit is not a pleading, is notfiled until 
after the pleadings are closed, and does not contain a 
statement of the factual basis for the claim. Its purpose is 
not to give notice of the plaintiff's claim, but rather to 
assure that malpractice claims for which there is no expert 
support will be terminated at an early stage in the 
proceedings. This state policy can be effectuated without 
compromising any of the policy choices reflected in Federal 
Rules 8 and 9. In short, these Federal Rules and the New 
Jersey Statute can exist side by side, "each controlling its 
own intended sphere of coverage without conflict." Walker 
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980). 5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Affidavit of merit (or similar) statutes have been applied by federal 
courts in many states without finding a direct collision with Federal 
Rules. See Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247 
(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that state statute requiring that complaint in 
medical malpractice action be accompanied by certificate of merit is a 
substantive law that applies in a federal diversity action); Connolly v. 
Foudree, 141 F.R.D. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (finding no direct conflict 
between state statute requiring early disclosure of expert witnesses in 
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In reaching our conclusion that there is no direct 
collision here, we are not unmindful of the stipulation in 
the New Jersey statute that a failure to file the required 
affidavit "shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of 
action." N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:53A-29. Contrary to the 
plaintiff's suggestion, we do not read this stipulation as 
implying that a failure to file the required affidavit somehow 
renders pleadings insufficient that would otherwise be 
sufficient. We read the "deeming" language to be no more 
than the New Jersey legislature's way of saying that the 
consequences of a failure to file shall be the same as those 
of a failure to state a claim. See Cornblatt v. Barow, 708 
A.2d 401, 415 (N.J. 1998) (interpreting "deeming" test to 
mean that the failure to file must result in a dismissal with 
prejudice unless extraordinary circumstances are shown). 
 
Finding no direct collision, we proceed to the second part 
of the Hanna analysis. Applying traditional Erie principles, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
professional liability cases and FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i), 
concluding 
 
the state statute went beyond the requirements of the Federal Rule, but 
did not conflict with it); Hill v. Morrison, 870 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Mo. 
1994) (finding Missouri statute requiring plaintiff to file affidavit of 
merit 
within 90 days of filing complaint goes beyond requirements of FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11 but does not conflict with the Federal Rule, and therefore both 
state and federal rules may be given effect in federal court in diversity 
action); Trierweiler v. Croxton and Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523 
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding no collision between Colorado statute requiring 
plaintiff or attorney to file certificate within 60 days of filing 
complaint 
and FED. R. CIV. P. 11, noting similar intent of the state and federal 
rules, but concluding the state rule is more narrowly tailored and 
assesses penalties on plaintiff not attorney, so it can co-exist with Rule 
11). But see, Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (finding a 
conflict between Federal Rule 8 and a Georgia statute requiring the filing 
of an affidavit with the complaint setting forth the facts upon which the 
claim is based). 
 
Similar statutes in other states have been routinely applied by federal 
courts sitting in diversity without specifically going through the Hanna 
analysis. See, e.g., Morlan v. Harrington, 658 F. Supp. 24 (D.N.D. 1986) 
(applying North Dakota expert affidavit statute that requires expert 
opinion within three months of filing medical malpractice action); Law v. 
Greenwich Hosp., No. CIV. 396CV2147(AHN), 1997 U.S. Dist. WL 695506 
(D. Conn. Oct. 21, 1997) (applying Connecticut statute requiring 
certificate to be filed with complaint in medical malpractice actions). 
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we conclude that the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute 
is substantive state law that must be applied by federal 
courts sitting in diversity. The state statute is outcome 
determinative on its face, and failure to apply it would 
encourage forum shopping and lead to the inequitable 
administration of the law. Further, we perceive no 
overriding federal interest here that would prevent 
application of the state law by the federal courts. 
 
By requiring dismissal for failure to adhere to the statute, 
the New Jersey legislature clearly intended to influence 
substantive outcomes. It sought early dismissal of meritless 
lawsuits, not merely to apply a new procedural rule. 
Clearly, failure to apply the statute in a federal diversity 
action where no affidavit of merit has been filed would 
produce a different outcome than that mandated in a state 
proceeding. 
 
In addition to undercutting the state's interest in early 
dismissal of meritless lawsuits, failure to apply the state 
statute in federal courts could promote forum-shopping, 
despite the relatively low hurdle the New Jersey affidavit 
requirement presents to a legitimate claimant. Plaintiffs 
who have been unable to secure expert support for their 
claims and face dismissal under the statute in state court 
may, by filing in the federal court, be able to survive beyond 
the pleading stage and secure discovery. The resulting 
opportunity for a "fishing expedition," which would hold the 
hope of turning up evidence of a meritorious claim or of a 
settlement to save defense litigation costs, can reasonably 
be expected to affect the forum choice of these plaintiffs. 
 
Failure to apply the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute 
also implicates the second of the "twin aims" of Erie, 
avoiding inequitable administration of the laws. A 
defendant in a federal court that refused to apply the 
affidavit requirement would be unfairly exposed to 
additional litigation time and expense before the dismissal 
of a non-meritorious lawsuit could be secured, merely 
because the plaintiff is a citizen of a different state. Perhaps 
more importantly, the reputation of the professional 
involved would be more likely to suffer the longer the 
lawsuit went on, putting added pressure on the defendant 
to settle rather than endure extensive discovery. 
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Finally, we must also consider whether any 
countervailing federal interests prevent the state law from 
being applied in federal court. The only relevant federal 
interest that has been suggested is an interest in 
maintaining the integrity of the federal system of pleading 
embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have 
previously concluded, however, that the New Jersey statute 
can be applied without compromising the federal system of 
pleading. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did 
not err in applying the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute. 
 
B. The Informed Consent Issue 
 
The plaintiff argues that, under New Jersey common law, 
expert testimony is not required to establish a cause of 
action based on lack of informed consent, and that, as a 
result, the affidavit of merit statute should not apply to 
Count II of her complaint. We disagree. 
 
Under New Jersey's prudent patient standard, a 
physician must disclose all information material to a 
reasonably prudent patient's decision to undergo the 
proposed treatment. See Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 
(N.J. 1988); Bennett v. Surgidev Corp., 710 A.2d 1023, 1026 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). Accordingly, under this 
"patient-focused" standard, an expert is not required to 
establish a standard for disclosure or to prove that a 
physician failed to meet the standard. See Tyndall v. 
Zabonski, 703 A.2d 980, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997). This does not mean, however, that a plaintiff with a 
claim based on lack of informed consent can prevail under 
New Jersey law without expert testimony. While expert 
testimony is not required to establish the standard for 
disclosure or to prove a physician failed to meet that 
standard, it is still required to prove other elements of her 
cause of action for lack of informed consent. See id. "A 
plaintiff alleging lack of informed consent has the burden of 
producing expert testimony to establish that the risk cited 
was one that the defendant should have been aware of 
because it was known to the medical community at the 
time." Id. Thus, "proof of a risk recognized by the 
professional community must come from a qualified 
expert." Id. 
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Because a plaintiff cannot prevail on a lack of informed 
consent claim under New Jersey law without expert 
testimony that the relevant risk was recognized by the 
professional community, we are confident that the New 
Jersey courts would find the affidavit of merit statute 
applicable to such claims. 
 
C. The "Extraordinary Circumstances" Issue 
 In Cornblatt v. Barow, 708 A.2d 401, 413 (N.J. 1998), the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that "a dismissal for 
failure to comply with the [affidavit of merit] statute should 
be with prejudice in all but extraordinary circumstances." 
The District Court in this case acknowledged that it would 
be appropriate to grant permission for the filing of the 
required affidavit nunc pro tunc if extraordinary 
circumstances were present, but found none. Accordingly, 
it refused to give such permission and dismissed the case 
with prejudice. 
 
What constitutes an "extraordinary circumstance" is a 
fact-sensitive analysis. See Hartsfield v. Fantini, 695 A.2d 
259 (N.J. 1997). To find extraordinary circumstances, the 
court must determine that those circumstances "did not 
arise from an attorney's mere carelessness or lack of proper 
diligence." Id. (internal quotes omitted). "Generally, 
substantial compliance with the filing limitation and 
allegations that defendants used negotiations to lull the 
plaintiffs into missing the filing date will not constitute 
extraordinary circumstances. . . ." Id. In short, the 
circumstances must be "exceptional and compelling." Id. at 
264. 
 
We agree with the District Court that the circumstances 
here fall short of "exceptional and compelling." As it noted, 
the plaintiff has provided no adequate excuse for her failure 
to comply with the statute, and the most reasonable 
inference from the record is that plaintiff's counsel was 
simply unaware of the affidavit of merit requirement. 
 
The plaintiff complains that because the defendant did 
not request the affidavit in his answer to her complaint and 
the District Court did not require it in the pre-trial 
scheduling order, she was "lulled" into believing an affidavit 
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of merit was not necessary. Neither the defendant nor the 
Court had a duty to call the attention of plaintiff's counsel 
to the requirements of the statute, however. If counsel had 
been aware of the statute, it is difficult to believe that he 
would have failed to comply in reliance on the answer and 
the scheduling order, and any such reliance, in any event, 
would have been unreasonable.6 The New Jersey statute 
clearly sets out the filing requirements and makes no 
provision for exemptions, except where the attorney applies 
for an extension for good cause. The plaintiff herefiled no 
motion for an extension and so had no statutory basis for 
an exemption from the affidavit requirement. 
 
The plaintiff compares her case to Hyman Zamft and 
Manard, L.L.C. v. Cornell, 707 A.2d 1068, 1072 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1998), where the Appellate Division of the 
Superior Court of New Jersey found extraordinary 
circumstances existed. There, a mediation order implied 
that a "time-out" existed for parties to refile pleadings. In 
contrast, nothing occurred during this case that would lead 
the parties to believe a "time-out" from filing deadlines 
existed. It is true the Hyman Zamft Court also noted that 
no demand for the affidavit of merit was made in the 
responsive pleading, and no case management order of the 
trial court required filing of an affidavit of merit. These 
factors were cited by the Court in the course of itsfinding 
"extraordinary circumstances." See id. at 1071, 1072. 
Nevertheless, the Court also noted that the mediation order 
alone was sufficient grounds for excusing the failure to file 
the affidavit in a timely manner, indicating that this factor 
was the most influential in its decision. 
 
The plaintiff here also compares some of the 
circumstances of her case to those of Barreiro v. Morrais, 
723 A.2d 1244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). In Barreiro, 
the Court remanded for a hearing on whether extraordinary 
circumstances existed because a protracted delay by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. If counsel had focused on the affidavit of merit statute, he would have 
been aware that it would be applied by the District Court. Prior to the 
filing of the complaint, the District Court had held that a federal court 
sitting in a diversity case was bound by that statute. RTC Mortgage Trust 
v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 981 F. Supp. 334 (D.N.J. 1997). 
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defendants in providing legible hospital records had 
prevented timely filing of an affidavit. The plaintiff in 
Barreiro first requested medical records before filing the 
complaint and was rebuffed. After filing the complaint, the 
plaintiff made several requests for records and 
transcriptions thereof, since the original records were 
indecipherable. The transcriptions were not provided until 
130 days after the defendants filed answers. See id. at 
1249. The Barreiro Court opined that the purpose of the 
60-day filing window is not to afford defendants with "a 
sword to fight off action by procrastinating in providing 
records and other relevant materials that a competent, 
conscientious expert would have to analyze before 
submitting an Affidavit of Merit." Id. at 1248. 
 
Unlike the situation in Barreiro, where the defendants 
ignored repeated requests for medical records after the 
complaint was filed, the defendant here provided the 
necessary medical records one week after the pre-trial 
scheduling conference and three weeks before the affidavit 
of merit had to be filed, sufficient time for the plaintiff to 
either obtain the affidavit of merit or file a motion for a 60- 
day extension. The repeated delays and indecipherable 
records in Barreiro constituted the "sword" the Court 
referred to in that case. In contrast, the "sword" the plaintiff 
complains about here is a perfectly legitimate motion filed 
by the defendant to dismiss the complaint for failure to file 
the affidavit of merit. 
 
Because there are no circumstances here that rise to the 
"extraordinary" level required by Cornblatt, we must affirm 
the District Court's decision to dismiss with prejudice, at 
least with respect to the negligent acts that were alleged to 
have occurred after June 29, 1995, the effective date of the 
affidavit of merit statute. 
 
D. The Pre-Statute Claims Issue 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that "the 
[affidavit of merit] statute does not apply to malpractice 
actions filed on or after the effective date of the statute if 
the facts giving rise to the malpractice complaint occurred 
before that date." Cornblatt, 708 A.2d at 406. The Cornblatt 
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Court found the term "occur" as used in the statute to have 
the same meaning as "accrue," so the statute only applies 
to causes of action which accrue on or after June 29, 1995. 
See id. at 408. A cause of action accrues when the facts 
occur which give rise to a right of action. 
 
The complaint in this action refers to three rhinoplasty 
proceedings, the first in January of 1994, the second in 
August of 1995, and the third in March of 1996. When 
deciding the defendant's motion to dismiss, the District 
Court looked beyond the complaint to determine whether 
the plaintiff had a claim that accrued prior to the effective 
date of the affidavit of merit statute. The Court dismissed 
the entire case based on the plaintiff's sworn answer to an 
interrogatory indicating that she "was satisfied with the 
first Rhinoplasty performed by Defendant," the only one 
that pre-dated the statute. As the Court correctly noted, "it 
is hornbook law that a court need not . . . consider a 
statement made to fend off a well supported motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment which contradicts a prior 
statement made under oath." Op. at 5-6, n.1. We agree that 
the plaintiff is not now in a position to base a malpractice 
claim on the January 1994 surgery. 
 
We note, however, that the record at the time of the 
dismissal contained sworn allegations, in the form of an 
affidavit of the plaintiff and her answers to interrogatories, 
that the defendant's negligent treatment of the plaintiff 
included the injection of cortisone into her nose prior to the 
effective date of the statute. Also included in the record was 
a medical report of a licensed physician opining that "the 
cortisone injections were contraindicated in her condition." 
App. at 61. 
 
We conclude that the District Court, having determined 
to go beyond the complaint in deciding defendant's motion 
to dismiss, could not, in fairness, ignore this competent 
evidence that pre-effective date malpractice occurred. 
Accordingly, we will remand for further proceedings on that 
claim only. 
 
E. The Default Judgment Issue 
 
In addition to appealing the District Court's dismissal of 
her complaint, the plaintiff contends the District Court 
 
                                15 
 
 
erred in declining to grant plaintiff's motion for default 
judgment based on defendant's late answer. Three factors 
control whether a default judgment should be granted: (1) 
prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the 
defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) 
whether defendant's delay is due to culpable conduct. See 
United States v. $55,518.85 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 
195 (3d Cir. 1984). The District Court's refusal to enter a 
default judgment is subject to review under the abuse of 
discretion standard. 
 
We agree with the District Court that a default judgment 
was not warranted here. The plaintiff is not prejudiced by 
the denial of default judgment because her failure to file the 
affidavit of merit on time was not related in any way to the 
defendant's late answer. The plaintiff received notice when 
the answer was filed May 8, 1998, and knew or should 
have known that the 60-day period to file the affidavit of 
merit began that day. If the plaintiff wanted to make a 
motion for default judgment before the 60-day affidavit of 
merit window closed, she could have done so. In addition, 
the defendant alleged a litigable defense to both counts of 
the complaint, and no record evidence suggests that the 
defendant's delay in filing an answer was due to culpable 
conduct, which in the Third Circuit is conduct that is 
"taken willfully or in bad faith." Gross v. Stereo Component 




We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for further proceedings on the plaintiff's claim that 
the defendant was guilty of malpractice with respect to 
cortisone injections occurring before June 29, 1995. 
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